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THE FRANK AMENDMENT TO THE
IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL
ACT OF 1986-A LABYRINTH FOR
LABOR LAW LITIGATORS
Richard M. Kobdish *
ON November 6, 1986, President Reagan signed the first major piece
of immigration legislation to reach the White House in the last third
of the century: the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.1
The media has widely covered this law, but thus far the main focus of the
reportage has been on the Act's provisions that allow for the legalization of
unlawful aliens and for sanctions against employers who hire illegals. Less
widely covered have been features that, for the first time, establish employer
"unfair immigration-related employment practices," which raise the spectre
of extensive litigation and substantial monetary liability.
The reach of this Act's employment discrimination provisions is one of the
broadest Congress has ever enacted, as it covers every employer that em-
ploys more than three persons. Broader still are its verification and sanction
terms, since they apply to every person or entity with one or more employ-
ees. No one knows for sure how many illegals are presently in this country.
Since over sixty percent of these illegals reside in states that share a border
with Mexico, however, this new statute could substantially impact labor re-
lation and human resource issues in Texas and in the rest of the Southwest.
While the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 may also bring
widespread social changes in those areas of the United States where illegals
have tended to settle, that chapter of the story on immigration reform will
take years to unfold. What can now be analyzed is the enforcement mecha-
nism of this new Act, which promises to be a prolific source of employment
law litigation for the foreseeable future. Although employer monetary sanc-
tions for hiring illegals is the first enforcement cornerstone of the new Act,
its second, unfair immigration-related employment practices, may generate
much more litigation. This Article constitutes an early analysis of the unfair
immigration-related employment practices provisions of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986.
B.B.A., University of Oklahoma; J.D., University of Houston; LL.M. (Labor Law),
George Washington University. Attorney at Law, Johnson & Swanson, Dallas, Texas.
1. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(1986) (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.S. (Law. Co-op. 1987)) [hereinafter 1986 Act].
Specific sections are cited to 8 U.S.C.S.
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I. THE "FRANK AMENDMENT"-ITS RECENT
ORIGINS AND RATIONALE
A. Recent Origins of Unfair Immigration-Related
Employment Practices Provisions
An examination of the proceedings of the Ninety-Eighth Congress pro-
vides the most recent and relevant starting point for an analysis of what
today are the unfair immigration-related employment practices provisions of
the 1986 Act. During the June 12, 1984, House floor debate concerning one
of the then-current versions of immigration reform, Representative Augus-
tus Hawkins (D-Calif.) offered Amendment No. 4, which was designed to
address certain employer discrimination that could result from the employer
sanctions portion of the bill.2 Among the arguments against the Hawkins
amendment was one that raised the point that while the amendment pro-
vided for the establishment of a kind of NLRB3 in the Department of Justice
to investigate and prosecute immigration-related discrimination, the amend-
ment also weakened penalties under the bill. 4 Following discussion, the
House defeated the Hawkins amendment by a vote of 253 to 166.
Shortly thereafter, Representative Barney Frank (D-Mass.) introduced
Amendment No. 6, which, like the defeated Hawkins amendment, provided
for an enforcement mechanism patterned after the one contained in the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act.5 In distinction, however, Amendment No. 6
also contained penalties for discriminatory conduct that were "actually stif-
fer than the sanctions [that] are on the employer sanction side of the pic-
ture. '" 6 With very little debate, the House passed Amendment No. 6 on a
vote of 404 to 9.
Following the defeat of immigration reform in the Ninety-Eighth Con-
gress, what has now come to be commonly known in the 1986 Act as the
"Frank Amendment" surfaced again, with a totally different enforcement
mechanism, in the first session of the Ninety-Ninth Congress. 7 The only
joint hearing ever held on the Frank Amendment took place on October 9,
1985.8
B. The Stated Rationale for the Frank Amendment
Throughout the 1986 Act's legislative history, both those who favored the
legislation, and those who opposed it, expressed the fear that employer sanc-
tions for hiring illegal aliens, particulary criminal sanctions, would cause
2. 130 CONG. REC. H5615 (daily ed. June 12, 1984) (statement of Rep. Hawkins).
3. See 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1982). This provision establishes the National Labor Relations
Board [hereinafter NLRB].
4. 130 CONG. REC. H5617-18 (daily ed. June 12, 1984) (statement of Rep. Mazzoli).
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982) [hereinafter NLRA].
6. 130 CONG. REC. H5642 (daily ed. June 12, 1984) (statement of Rep. Glickman).
7. H.R. 3080, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1985).
8. Anti-Discrimination Provision of H.R. 3080: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration, Refugees and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary and the
Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1985) [hereinafter Joint Hearing].
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widespread discrimination against citizens who were minorities, or against
aliens who were legally in this country. 9 In devising remedies for the per-
ceived potential evils, the House was aware that title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act' 0 already made employment discrimination on the basis of na-
tional origin illegal. Title VII is limited, however, in that it covers only em-
ployers with fifteen or more employees,"I a restriction that eliminates
approximately half of the employing enterprises in the United States. More-
over, only those employees who work twenty or more calendar weeks per
year come within the ambit of title VII,' 2 thus removing from its coverage
many people who work in highly seasonal industries, such as agriculture.
In addition, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Espinoza v. Farah
Manufacturing Co.,' 3 title VII's ban on national origin discrimination does
not mean that discrimination on the basis of citizenship or alienage per se is
unlawful. 14 While the Court in Espinoza expressly declined to decide the
issue of whether the Civil Rights Act of 186615 prohibits discrimination by
private employers on the basis of citizenship,' 6 lower courts' subsequent de-
cisions have split on this issue. '7 These decisions have created inconsistencies
in employment discrimination law.
9. For example, Representative Hawkins, speaking in the second session of the Ninety-
Eighth Congress on behalf of his unsuccessful amendment to House Report 1510, stated that
"there are those in this Nation who would use this measure as a pretext to deny employment to
United States citizens and aliens lawfully residing here and by right, simply because they look
or sound foreign." 130 CONG. REC. H5617 (daily ed. June 12, 1984) (statement of Rep. Haw-
kins). Representative Robert Garcia's (D-N.Y.) opinion proved illustrative of the many other
opinions expressed along these same lines at the Joint Hearing when he stated that:
(P]eople like myself, who are being lumped together with undocumented per-
sons (will be discriminated against] simply because of the way we look or the
way we may sound. . . . I am also certain that most [employers will not be]
trying to be vindictive or discriminatory. They [will be] simply trying to protect
themselves. They [are not] attorneys; they don't understand the details of the
law .... These people have businesses to run, and their first instinct is not to
worry about whether or not they are being discriminatory; they worry instead,
about fines that affect their profits.
While I'm against sanctions for those reasons, it's not the bigots that truly
concern me .... No, it's the ordinary, the small business persons, who aren't
going to want to take any chances, because, frankly, they can't afford to. But if
sanctions are to be, then the anti-discrimination provisions in this bill must re-
main. Those provisions, at least, offer some protection for members of my com-
munity who would, inevitably be discriminated against if this bill becomes law.
Joint Hearing, supra note 8, at 119-20. For one contrary view, see the testimony of Paul
Grossman, Esq. Id. at 225.
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
11. Id. § 2000e(b).
12. Id.
13. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
14. Id. at 95. The United States Supreme Court noted, however, that "a citizenship re-
quirement might be but one part of a wider scheme of unlawful national-origin discrimina-
tion." Id. at 92; see Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of National Origin, 29 C.F.R. § 1606.5 (1980).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982) [hereinafter section 1981].
16. 414 U.S. at 96 n.9.
17. Compare Thomas v. Rohner-Gherig & Co., 582 F. Supp. 669, 672-73 (N.D. Ill. 1984)
(claim of alienage discrimination may be available under section 1981) with Rios v. Marshall,




Because of these perceived inconsistencies in existing law, Congress, while
considering the 1986 Act, saw the need to strengthen the protections against
national origin and citizenship discrimination if immigration reform was to
contain both civil and criminal employer sanctions. Rather than amend title
VII and thereby entrust to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
the investigation of discrimination claims raised by immigration reform,
Congress elected instead to establish an entirely new set of definitions, condi-
tions, and procedures. On March 23, 1987, the Department of Justice issued
a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 which set forth enforcement procedures
and standards for the unfair immigration-related employment practices pro-
vision of the 1986 Act.19 With a few exceptions that will be discussed below,
the Proposed Regulations merely repeat the literal language of the Act itself.
They shed little light upon the many inconsistencies and ambiguities con-
tained in the 1986 Act.
II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE FRANK AMENDMENT: 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324b
A. Sections 1324b(a)(1)(A) and (B): "General Rule"
Sections 1324b(a)(1)(A) and (B) make it unlawful to discriminate in the
employment or in the termination of employment of any individual (other
than an unauthorized alien) because of his or her national origin, or, in the
case of a citizen or "intending citizen," because of his or her citizenship
status.20 Through this language, Congress has created an entirely new cause
of action for alleged employment discrimination. Congress has modified the
Supreme Court's holding in Espinoza that an employer who comes within
the scope of title VII may legally refuse to hire noncitizens, unless such a
criterion is found to be a pretext for national origin discrimination. 2' Under
section 1324b, with certain exceptions, no employer of more than three em-
ployees may legally maintain this employment standard. 22 Further, section
1324b(a)(1)(A) expands the federal ban against national origin discrimina-
tion. While title VII covers only employers of fifteen or more employees,
national origin discrimination covers a much broader universe of individuals
under the 1986 Act. Specifically, the Act picks up those who work for em-
ployers employing four to fourteen people.
On the other hand, the scope of protection provided by section 1324b ap-
pears much narrower than that in the title VII context. Title VII makes it
unlawful to discriminate with respect to "compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment."' 23 These terms create a very broad collection
of employment rights. Section 1324b(a)(1), however, specifically refers only
"to the hiring, or recruitment or referral for a fee" or the "discharging" of
18. Proposed Regulations of Department of Justice on Unfair Immigration-Related Em-
ployment Practices, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 54, at D-I (Mar. 23, 1987) (to be codified at
28 C.F.R. § 44) [hereinafter Proposed Regulations].
19. Id.
20. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324b(a)(1)(A), (B) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
21. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 95 (1973).
22. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324b(a)(2)(A) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982).
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an individual. Consequently, one may make a strong argument that under
section 1324b entities employing between four and fourteen people may, af-
ter an individual is hired, treat that person less favorably than nonminorities
in promotional opportunities, raises, and the like, solely because of the per-
son's national origin. Likewise, citizens or "intending citizens"'24 might also
suffer such discriminatory treatment after they are on such an entity's pay-
roll. No doubt much litigation will arise in attempts to clarify this confusing
situation.
B. Sections 1324b(a)(2)(A), (B), and (C): "Exceptions"
Sections 1324b(a)(2)(A), (B), and (C) detail statutory exceptions to the
bans on unfair immigration-related employment practices discussed above.
Section 1324b(a)(2)(A) excludes from coverage employers of three or fewer
employees. Section 1324b(a)(2)(B) states that national origin discrimination
covered by section 703 of title VI1 5 is not an unfair immigration-related
employment practice for purposes of the bill. Finally, section
1324b(a)(2)(C) provides that the 1986 Act does not render unlawful that
citizenship discrimination that is mandated by federal, state, or local law, or
by government contract, or determined by the Attorney General to be "es-
sential for an employer to do business" 26 with a governmental agency or
department.
Accordingly, one effect of sections 1324b(a)(2)(A) and (B) is to lower the
threshold of coverage with respect to national origin discrimination, so as to
include those entities that employ between four and fourteen persons. Sec-
tion 1324b(a)(2)(B) contains, however, other significant points for considera-
tion. Section 703(c) of title VII, 27 for instance, states that, with respect to
religion, sex, or national origin, discrimination in employment is permitted
"where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion28 reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular busi-
ness or enterprise."'29 Courts have generally construed this BFOQ exception
to title VII narrowly, 30 and one could argue that section 1324b(a)(2)(B) in-
corporates into immigration-related employment practices these same nar-
row title VII BFOQ defenses. As an example, although not strictly a BFOQ
question, federal courts in a title VII context have permitted a criterion that
an applicant or employee must have the ability to speak the English lan-
24. See infra notes 35-44 and accompanying text.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982).
26. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324b(a)(2)(C) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982).
28. Hereinafter BFOQ.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982).
30. See, e.g., Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1370 (11 th Cir. 1982) (courts should
construe BFOQ exception narrowly, and party attempting to use exception carries burden of
proving its validity); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 387 (5th Cir.)
(EEOC guidelines dictate that courts construe BFOQ exception narrowly, in order that excep-
tion not swallow rule), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co., 408 F.2d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 1969) (legislative history indicates that Congress intended
courts to construe BFOQ exception narrowly).
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guage where such a requirement had a reasonable business justification and
was not overly broad in coverage. 3'
Yet, if Congress had intended title VII's BFOQ defenses to apply to the
1986 Act, it clearly could have so stated. By its literal terms, all section
1324b(a)(2)(B) does is leave to the title VII statutory scheme the prevention
of national origin discrimination by employers of fifteen or more employees.
The provision says nothing about whether BFOQs or other title VII defenses
apply to alleged violations of the 1986 Act.
Indeed, House Report 3810 at one time contained a section, which would
have followed section 1324b(a)(2)(C), that clearly exempted from unfair im-
migration-related employment practices discrimination based upon a per-
son's proficiency in using the English language in those situations where
such language proficiency constituted a BFOQ. This provision, however,
did not survive the 1986 House-Senate Conference. Accordingly, a person
may argue that no BFOQs exist for national origin discrimination under the
1986 Act, and, therefore, an English language proficiency job requirement is
not a defense to a charge of national origin discrimination by small employ-
ers covered by the new bill, while the same requirement would still be a valid
defense for those larger employers subject to title VII. In any event, regard-
less of whether national origin BFOQ defenses are available to employers
under the 1986 Act, section 1324b(a)(2)(B) does not apply to discrimination
against citizens or intending citizens, and no such defenses exist under the
1986 Act with respect to those two protected classes.
Finally, section 1324b(a)(2)(C) permits discrimination based on citizen-
ship status, when citizenship constitutes a condition precedent to employ-
ment pursuant to a law or government policy, or when the Attorney General
determines such an employment criteria to be essential for an employer to do
business with the government. 32 This exception, therefore, allows the gov-
ernment to discriminate on the basis of citizenship in its own employment
decisions33 and permits certain government contractors to hire only citizens.
Curiously, in Espinoza the Supreme Court found citizenship discrimination
per se to be outside the protection of title VII partly on the grounds that to
include citizenship in an interpretation of the term national origin "would
require us to conclude that Congress itself has repeatedly flouted its own
declaration of policy. This Court cannot lightly find such a breach of
faith."' 34 The public may speculate whether in a future title VII case the
31. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270-71 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113
(1981); see also Kureshy v. City Univ., 561 F. Supp. 1098, 1110 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (court upheld
university's denial of plaintiff teacher's tenure because his difficulties with spoken English
made him less effective teacher), aff'd, 742 F.2d 1431 (2d Cir. 1984).
32. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324b(a)(2)(C) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
33. See Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriation Act, Pub. L.
No. 92-35 1, § 602, 86 Stat. 471 (1972); Public Works for Water, Pollution Control, and Power
Development and Atomic Energy Commission Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 91-439, § 502,
84 Stat. 902 (1970); Public Works for Water, Pollution Control, and Power Development and
Atomic Energy Commission Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 91-144, § 502, 83 Stat. 336-37
(1969); Exec. Order No. 1997, 1914 C.S.R. 118.
34. 414 U.S. 86, 90-91 (1973).
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Court might come to a different conclusion, since under the 1986 Act Con-
gress has made it unlawful for employers to do what the federal government
practices on a regular basis.
C. Sections 1324b(a)(3)(A) and (B): "Definition of Citizen
or Intending Citizen"
As discussed above, the antidiscrimination provisions of the 1986 Act ap-
ply to both United States citizens and intending citizens. 35 The former class
of protected persons is self-explanatory, and Congress gave it little statutory
attention. The latter protected class, however, is defined in detail in one of
the more confusing sections of the 1986 Act.
For an alien to be considered an intending citizen and, therefore, pro-
tected from discrimination under section 1324b(a)(3)(B), he or she must sat-
isfy numerous rigid filing qualifications and deadlines.36 First, the individual
must stand as either a lawful permanent resident alien, a refugee, an asylee,
or a newly legalized alien. 37 In addition, for an alien to qualify as an in-
tending citizen, he or she must demonstrate his or her desire to be a citizen
of the United States by completing a declaration of intention to become a
citizen.38 Also, such a person must, within six months of eligibility, com-
plete an application for naturalization. 39 Those aliens who became eligible
to apply for naturalization before November 6, 1986, had until May 5, 1987,
to apply for naturalization. 4° Aliens who achieve eligibility after November
6, 1986, have six months from their date of eligibility to apply for naturaliza-
tion. 41 The alien's failure to meet these deadlines deprives him or her of
intending-citizen protection from job discrimination. Furthermore, an alien
who has met all of the procedural and temporal requirements, but has not
been naturalized as a citizen within two years of application, likewise forfeits
intending-citizen protection.42 Delays in paperwork processing caused by
the Immigration and Naturalization Service43 are not counted in this two-
year period." This section appears highly subjective and will likely generate
much litigation in the future.
35. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
36. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324b(a)(3)(B) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
37. Id. § 1324b(a)(3)(B)(i).
38. Id. subsection (ii). The declaration of intent to become a citizen is embodied in INS
Form N-300.
39. Id. INS Form N-400 constitutes the application for naturalization.
40. See id. The 1986 Act's effective date was November 6, 1986. The statute provides
that aliens must apply for naturalization within six months of being eligible, or if the alien had
been eligible for longer than six months, "within six months after the date of enactment of this




44. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324b(a)(3)(B) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
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D. Section 1324b(a)(4): "Additional Exception Providing Right to Prefer
Equally Qualified Citizens"
As previously stated, in the Ninety-Eighth Congress's Frank Amendment
to House Report 1510 the House reacted to the Supreme Court's Espinoza
decision by making discrimination against citizens or intending citizens an
unfair immigration-related employment practice.45 The House took up the
merits of this issue again, however, during the debates of the Ninety-Ninth
Congress when Representative Daniel Lungren (R-Calif.) offered his
Amendment No. 5.46 That amendment, which is now section 1324b(a)(4) of
the 1986 Act, added an additional exception by making it lawful for an em-
ployer to prefer a United States citizen over an alien "if the two individuals
are equally qualified."'47 Obviously the words "equally qualified" constitute
the key portion of section 1324b(a)(4). Representative Lungren, the author
of this section, confirmed that a determination of this issue in a particular
case will often be left to the litigation process established by the 1986 Act.
48
In the context of other federal statutes designed to remedy employment
discrimination against minorities, the courts have often tended toward a
statutory construction that affords victims of prohibited discrimination the
maximum protection.49 For example, in Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone
& Telegraph Co. 50 the court had to decide the availability of title VII's
BFOQ defense to an employer who precluded females from holding jobs that
involved lifting loads in excess of 30 pounds. In regard to its conclusion that
such a BFOQ defense was not applicable, the court stated that "when deal-
ing with a humanitarian remedial statute which serves an important public
purpose, it has been the practice to cast the burden of proving an exception
to the general policy of the statute upon the person claiming it. ' ' 51 This case
law questions the accuracy of Representative Lungren's comment that
"doubt would be resolved in favor of the employer."' 52 Given that the 1986
Act for the first time provides protection from discrimination to aliens that
are intending citizens, employers giving preference to a United States citizen
over such a newly protected person may be subject to close scrutiny in
litigation.
45. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
46. 132 CONG. REC. H9767 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. Lungren).
47. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324b(a)(4) (Law. Co-op. 1987) (emphasis added).
48. 132 CONG. REC. H9767-68 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. Lungren). Rep-
resentative Lungren said:
I assume the person who would finally make the determination would be the
governmental structure that has been set up in the Frank amendment.... It
will only come up if an action were taken against an employer. He would have
to show they were equally qualified.
I would say in most cases, I would hope that the doubt would be resolved in
favor of the employer to make the decision as to equal qualifications.
Id.
49. See A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1942); Weeks v. Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 1969).
50. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
51. Id. at 232 (citing A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. at 493).
52. 132 CONG. REC. H9767-68 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. Lungren).
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E. Section 1324b(b)(1): "Charges of Violations-In General"
Section 1324b(b)(1) of the 1986 Act allows persons charging unfair immi-
gration-related employment practices to file such a charge with a "Special
Counsel" within the Department of Justice.53 The individual allegedly suf-
fering from the discrimination, any person or organization acting on his or
her behalf, or the INS may file the charge. 54 Pursuant to the 1986 Act's
direction, the Attorney General, in his Proposed Regulations, has developed
charge forms for the charging party to fill out and file with the Special Coun-
sel. 55 Within ten days of receipt of the charge form, the Special Counsel
should serve a copy of such form upon the employer. 56
The ten-day requirement for the service of charges may possibly present
the most prolific area of litigation under section 1324b(b)(1). Arguably,
however, this provision offers another parallel that may be drawn between
the 1986 Act and title VII. Subsections 706(b) and (e) of title VII57 likewise
have ten-day service requirements. The courts, however, generally have held
that the EEOC's failure to serve a charge within such statutory periods does
not create a jurisdictional impediment to a subsequent private action. 58 Ac-
cordingly, in litigation under the 1986 Act, one might anticipate that the
Special Counsel's failure to follow the technical requirements of section
1324b(b)(1) will not result in an administrative law judge's 59 dismissal of a
complaint.
F Section 1324b(b)(2): "No Overlap with EEOC Complaints"
Obviously, great potential exists for tension and overlap between the 1986
Act's discrimination provisions and those contained in title VII. For exam-
ple, both statutes prohibit national origin discrimination, with title VII ap-
plying to employers of fifteen or more persons, and the 1986 Act to
employers of between four and fourteen persons. 60 The applicable statutory
scheme in a given case may become extremely important to the respective
parties. To illustrate, an employer might prefer the coverage of title VII
because of the discovery and other procedural rights available under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that litigants possess in federal district
court lawsuits brought pursuant to that statute. On the other hand, a person
charging discrimination might prefer to have his or her claim considered
under the 1986 Act since its litigation procedures may cost less for the
charging party.
53. 8 U.S.C.S § 1324b(b)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
54. Id.
55. Proposed Regulations, supra note 18, app. A.
56. Id. § 44.301(e).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (e) (1982).
58. See, e.g., Smith v. American President Lines, Ltd., 571 F.2d 102, 107 n.8 (2d Cir.
1978) (omission on the part of the EEOC to file timely charges did not bar plaintiff's suit);
Johnson v. ITT-Thompson Indus., 323 F. Supp. 1258, 1260 (N.D. Miss. 1971) (failure of
EEOC to attempt conciliation does not bar private suit).
59. Hereinafter AL.
60. See supra notes 11, 22 and accompanying text.
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Accordingly, the determination of whether the employing enterprise em-
ploys fifteen persons or more becomes important. This task may not be as
simple as it appears at first glance, since the House Committee on the Judici-
ary Report on House Report 3810 states that it did not intend the sanction
portion of the 1986 Act to apply to "casual hires."' 6 1 Assuming that casual
hires likewise may not be counted as employees for purposes of determining
whether national origin discrimination falls under the 1986 Act or title VII,
this provision also appears pregnant with litigation possibilities.
In an attempt to minimize the potential for overlap and forum shopping,
section 1324b(b)(2) states that a party cannot file an unfair immigration-
related employment practice charge if the party has also filed a title VII
charge under the same set of facts, and vice versa.62 When a charge is dis-
missed as being outside the scope of the forum initially chosen by the ag-
grieved individual, however, section 1324b(b)(2) does allow for the filing of a
second charge in the alternative forum. 63 An employer, therefore, may have
to defend its actions in a particular circumstance both before the Special
Counsel appointed under the 1986 Act and before the EEOC. Simultaneous
defenses under these two statutes, however, will not be required.
64
Finally, in many situations the distinction between national origin dis-
crimination and discrimination based upon citizenship will be difficult to as-
certain. Both typically will involve a minority noncitizen failing to obtain
desired employment, or losing his or her position. As recognized by section
1324b(b)(2), both will often arise under the same set of facts. For these rea-
sons, and because a 1986 Act action for citizenship discrimination applies to
all employers, regardless of size, noncitizen minorities are likely to choose
the 1986 Act.
G. Sections 1324b(c)(1)-(4): "Special Counsel, Appointment, Duties,
Compensation, and Regional Offices"
The 1986 Act provides for the President to appoint, with the advice and
consent of the Senate, a Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair
Employment Practices within the Department of Justice. 65 This person will
serve a four-year term. 66 His or her duties include the investigation of dis-
crimination charges and the prosecution of complaints before ALJs.67 The
statute also directs the Special Counsel to establish regional offices around
the United States in order to assist in the carrying out of his or her duties.
68
Authorities in the field have estimated that substantially more litigation
61. H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 57 (1986).
62. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324b(b)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
63. Id.
64. See id. The 1986 Act does not, however, prohibit a person from simultaneously bring-
ing a claim of unfair immigration-related employment practices and a complaint in the U.S.
district court under a section 1981 theory. See id.
65. Id. § 1324b(c).
66. Id. § 1324b(c)(1).




and other activity will arise under the unfair immigration-related employ-
ment practices provisions of the 1986 Act than under its section 1324a,
which deals with verification and sanctions. 69  Yet, the Congressional
Budget Office's July 15, 1986, report submitted to the House Committee on
Ways and Means, estimated $422 million were necessary in increased appro-
priations for the INS so that, among other things, it could enforce employer
sanctions under the 1986 Act.70 In that same report, however, the Congres-
sional Budget Office estimated a cost of only two million dollars to attach to
the activities of the Special Counsel and, even in that regard, stated that "the
bill does not ... authorize appropriations for this activity. '71 This budget
constraint may result in overt pressures and tensions in the next year given
the widely held opinion that the office of the Special Counsel will necessarily
become a large unit.72 Indeed, in testimony before the Joint Committee on
House Report 3080, the Department of Justice opposed the bill, in part, be-
cause it would create a new expensive governmental organization. 73
H. Section 1324b(d)(1): "Investigation of Charges by Special Counsel"
Section 1324b(d)(1) of the 1986 Act requires the Special Counsel to inves-
tigate each charge and, within 120 days of receipt of the charge, to make
determinations of whether reasonable cause exists to believe the charge is
true and whether to bring a complaint before an ALJ. 74 The 1986 Act pos-
sesses no guidelines relative to the procedures that the Special Counsel must
follow. Presumably, the office of this Special Counsel will eventually issue
its own rules, regulations, and statements of procedure. With respect to the
Special Counsel's charge investigation powers, however, the Proposed Regu-
lations state that, among other things, he or she "may propound interrogato-
ries, requests for production of documents, and requests for admissions."' 75
The Proposed Regulations grant no such discovery privileges to respondents
in litigation of charge allegations. 76
Furthermore, because the statutory scheme of the Frank Amendment bor-
rows from the procedures set forth in both title VII and in the NLRA, and
since both the EEOC and the General Counsel of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board77 investigate employment discrimination charges, one may make
69. See id. § 1324a. A relatively recent edition of Interpreter Releases stated: "In the long
run, as a practical matter employers may need to worry more about complying with the an-
tidiscrimination provisions than with the employer sanctions and paperwork requirements....
[T]he potential for a private right of action, combined with attorney's fees, should help ensure
that the antidiscrimination provisions are enforced." 63 Interpreter Releases 1057 (Nov. 17,
1986).
70. H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 17 (1986).
71. Id.
72. Joint Hearing, supra note 8, at 221 (testimony of Paul Grossman).
73. Id. at 184.
74. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324b(d)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1987). For a more detailed discussion of the
section of the 1986 Act dealing with the designation of ALJs, see infra notes 114-117 and
accompanying text.





certain assumptions with regard to the procedures that will be followed by
the Special Counsel. For example, the Special Counsel possibly may not
comply with the 1986 Act's 120-day investigatory deadline. The EEOC has
existed for more than twenty years, possesses numerous field offices staffed
with experienced personnel, has some 3,000 persons on its payroll, and en-
joys a budget of over $163 million.78 Nevertheless, case backlogs, occasion-
ally approaching the 100,000 level, have plagued that agency over the years.
Obviously, such a workload has often resulted in the EEOC's exceeding stat-
utory deadlines, but courts have not held that such omissions affect jurisdic-
tion in subsequent litigation proceedings. 79 One may expect similar results
with respect to the 120-day deadline placed upon the Special Counsel. Also,
the Special Counsel will likely develop procedures for such items as negoti-
ated settlements, fact-finding conferences, and the acceptance of a respon-
dent's evidentiary and position statements. Both the EEOC and the NLRB
General Counsel utilize some, or all, of these procedures in the processing of
charges brought under their respective statutes.
L Section 1324b(d)(2): "Private Actions"
The private action portion of the 1986 Act states that if, after passage of
the 120-day investigation period discussed above, the Special Counsel has
not filed a complaint with an ALJ alleging "knowing and intentional dis-
criminatory activity or a pattern or practice of discriminatory activity," 80
the person aggrieved may file his or her complaint directly with the ALJ.8 1
This section 1324b(d)(2) presently evidences, and will likely remain, one of
the most controversial portions of the statute. For example, in his statement
accompanying the signing of the 1986 Act, President Reagan said that the
reference to "intentional discriminatory activity" in section 1324b(d)(2)
means that use of the disparate impact theory developed under title VII will
be improper. 82 He went on to state that "a facially neutral employer selec-
tion practice that is employed without discriminatory intent will be permissi-
ble under the provisions of Section 274B . . . [and] unless the plaintiff
presents evidence that the employer has intentionally discriminated on pro-
scribed grounds, the employer need not offer any explanation for his em-
ployee selection procedures. '8 3 Representative Frank, the author of the
amendment of the same name, recently disagreed with the President's state-
ment and argued that a victim of discrimination under the 1986 Act does not
78. Joint Hearing, supra note 8, at 15-16, 23.
79. See Chromcraft Corp. v. EEOC, 465 F.2d 745, 747-48 (5th Cir. 1972) (absent showing
of prejudice, EEOC's delay of filing charges due to backlog not bar to suit); Washington v.
TG&Y Stores Co., 324 F. Supp. 849, 854-55 (W.D. La. 1971) (absent showing of prejudice,
delays in filing not per se unreasonable).
80. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324b(d)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
81. Id.
82. President's Statement Accompanying Signing of S.1200, at 2 (November 6, 1986),





have to prove discriminatory intent. 84
One possible explanation for these widely divergent points of view
presented itself in the President's statement on the 1986 Act in which he
observed that, with regard to the types of action that may be brought pursu-
ant to section 1324b(d)(2), "paragraph (d)(2) refers to 'knowing and inten-
tional discrimination' and 'a pattern or practice of discriminatory
activity.' ",85 Yet, instead of the italicized "and," the bill itself connects the
phrases "knowing and intentional discrimination" and "a pattern or practice
of discriminatory activity" with the word "or," not "and." One may argue
that instead of the 1986 Act's referring to a single cause of action theory that
requires pattern or practice cases to be committed "knowing[ly]" and "in-
tentional[ly]," the applicable provision sets forth two separate and distinct
cause of action theories. The first theory involves individual discriminatory
events that persons must commit knowingly and intentionally in order to be
unlawful. The second cause of action theory concerns those pattern or prac-
tice activities that typically arise in class-type cases. This interpretation ap-
pears consistent with the overall approach of section 1324b, which borrowed
some provisions from the NLRA,8 6 but even more from title VII.8 7 Sup-
porters of this position note that title VII case law makes intent to discrimi-
nate the most relevant factor in disparate treatment cases, or matters that
ordinarily involve a single claimant.8 8 They suggest that, since Congress
borrowed so much else for section 1324b from title VII, ALJs and subse-
quent reviewing courts will show a strong tendency to apply title VII's bur-
den of proof standards to unfair immigration-related employment practice
allegations. The allocation of litigation proof, as developed in the title VII
context, is divided into three components: (1) plaintiff's establishment of a
prima facie case; (2) defendant's rebuttal through articulation of a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision; and (3) plain-
tiff's proof that the reason advanced by the defendant was a pretext for
intentional discrimination. The plaintiff at all times has the burden of
persuasion. 89
In contrast to title VII's disparate treatment theory, proof of discrimina-
tion under title VII's adverse impact theory focuses on the effects of employ-
ment practices, rather than the underlying intent. This theory generally
involves situations where a facially neutral standard disproportionately im-
84. N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1986, at A12, col. 1.
85. President's Statement, supra note 82, at 2 (emphasis added).
86. See supra note 5.
87. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
88. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981); Inter-
national Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 (1977); McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973). The United States Supreme Court in Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters stated that " '[d]isparate treatment' . . . is the most easily
understood type of discrimination .... Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it
can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment." 431 U.S. at
335 n.15.
89. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981); McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
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pacts upon a protected class of persons.90 The imposition of a requirement
that all applicants for employment possess a U.S. passport would provide an
example of a disparate impact-type employment standard that courts may
construe as having an unlawfully discriminatory impact under the 1986 Act,
notwithstanding its benign intent.
A complicating factor to the analysis of section 1324b(d)(2) arises in that,
in discussing the "pattern or practice" language contained in the criminal
penalty portion of section 1324a,9 1 the Report of the House Committee on
the Judiciary stated an intent that decisional standards reached through liti-
gation involving other statutes be applied to the 1986 Act.92 The cases cited
in the Committee's report 93 "indicate that the term 'pattern or practice' has
its generic meaning and shall apply to regular, repeated and intentional ac-
tivities, but does not include isolated, sporadic or accidental acts."' 94 The
Committee Report then added that persons should apply such an interpreta-
tion to the unfair immigration-related employment practices provisions of
the bill. 95 President Reagan may have been referring to this portion of the
Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary when he stated that only
intentional discrimination will give rise to a section 1324b cause of action. If
this interpretation is correct, a person may argue that the Report of the
House Committee on the Judiciary erroneously concluded that the word
"intentional" was relevant to any 1986 Act "pattern or practice" situation
other than section 1324a(f), which deals with criminal violations. Such an
analysis may be warranted since each of the cases cited by the Committee as
examples of pattern or practice decisional law involving other statutes con-
sisted of a civil rights matter.9 6 The holdings of these cases remain consis-
tent with the title VII cause of action and burden of proof discussion
outlined above. 97
At first glance, the Attorney General's Proposed Regulations seem to fol-
low strictly President Reagan's interpretation of the standard of proof neces-
sary to make out a violation of the 1986 Act.98 In the "Supplementary
Information" Section II to the Proposed Regulations, the Attorney General
relies, in part, upon the portion of the Report of the House Committee on
the Judiciary to find that "unintentional discrimination merely on the basis
of [its] disparate impact" 99 was not unlawful. The Attorney General added,
90. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Court stated that "good
intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures ... that
operate as 'built-in headwinds'.... Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences
of employment practices, not simply the motivation." Id. at 432 (emphasis in original).
91. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324a (Law. Co-op. 1987).
92. H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1986).
93. Id. (citing International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977);
United States v. International Ass'n of Iron Workers Local 1, 438 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Mayton, 335 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1964)).
94. Id. (emphasis added).
95. Id.
96. See id.
97. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.




however, that broad circumstantial evidence and statistics may effectively
prove discriminatory intent.10° Given this rather broad explanation to his
Proposed Regulation, the Attorney General may be indicating his view that
the burden of proof required to make out a pattern or practice case of inten-
tional discrimination is not so overwhelming as to discourage potential
claimants. Much litigation may be necessary before this issue is settled.
Other parts of section 1324b(d)(2) also deserve analysis. For example,
this portion of the 1986 Act allows individuals to file complaints directly
with ALJs.10  This procedure will appear completely foreign to most, if not
all, ALJs in the federal government and is likely to cause considerable confu-
sion. Also, while an individual must wait a minimum of 120 days from the
filing of the charge before instituting a complaint before an ALJ, there is no
outer limit on how long an individual may delay filing after the 120-day
period has run.10 2 In this regard, section 1324b appears unlike title VII, in
that the latter statute requires an aggrieved person to file a complaint in a
United States district court within 90 days of receipt of a right-to-sue notice
from the EEOC, or else the person may have waived his or her right to
initiate litigation.10 3
In his Proposed Regulations, however, the Attorney General attempts to
create a limitations period.1° 4 The Proposed Regulations require a filed
complaint with an ALJ within 90 days after the Special Counsel's 120-day
period. 10 5 One must wait to see whether the courts will allow the Attorney
General, by regulation, to determine so critical a matter as a limitations pe-
riod, when Congress did not see fit to do so itself. Moreover, since the Spe-
cial Counsel will in many cases be unable to complete his investigation and
issue his determination in the post-charge filing 120-day period, the limita-
tions period appears both harsh and a violation of the public policy favoring
settlement and conciliation.
J. Section 1324b(d)(3): "Time Limitations on Complaints"
Pursuant to section 1324b(d)(3), a party may not file a complaint with an
100. Id. The Attorney General stated:
Under this standard it is not sufficient to allege that a pattern or practice of
activity results in discriminatory effects. Discriminatory intent may be shown,
of course, by both direct and circumstantial evidence. Thus, the discriminatory
intent standard clearly encompasses more than just cases where employers have
made blatantly bigoted remarks. Indeed, the model of proof enunciated in Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and Texas Dep't of Com-
munity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), is applicable. Moreover,
statistics may be used in appropriate cases to aid in proving discriminatory
intent.
Id.
101. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324b(d)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
102. See id.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1982).
104. Proposed Regulations, supra note 18, § 44.303(c).
105. Id. This provision specifically states that a charging party "may bring his or her com-
plaint directly before an administrative law judge within 90 days of the end of the 120-day




ALJ in cases in which the complaining party has waited in excess of 180
days from the alleged discriminatory event before submitting the charge to
the Special Counsel. 106 The question will no doubt often arise as to whether
this 180-day charge filing requirement is jurisdictional, in the sense that fail-
ure to comply will absolutely extinguish the subject matter jurisdiction of the
ALJ. In coming to grips with this issue, the ALJs and reviewing courts
might rely again upon established title VII decisional case law. Under title
VII, for instance, the Supreme Court has held that a person who fails to file
his charge of discrimination within 180 days from the event becomes es-
topped from maintaining a cause of action.10 7 This standard is an elastic
one, however, which is subject to equitable extension.
Finally, the 1986 Act apparently only makes employer discrimination in
hiring and firing unlawful. These actions constitute concrete, nonrecurring
events. The finality of these events means that under this statute a claim that
alleged late filings may be excused because they involve continuing violations
appears unlikely. In this respect, title VII law may not apply to section
1324b.
K Section 1324b(e)(1): "Hearings-Notice"
The Frank Amendment, at section 1324b(e)(1), provides that ALJs are to
serve upon the respondent-defendant employer a copy of the complaint that
either the Special Counsel or the individual claimant filed. 10 8 At the same
time, the ALJ must issue and serve upon the parties a notice of hearing. 10 9
The complaining party may amend its complaint at any time, with the
judge's consent, prior to the issuance of the AL's decision and order. 10
Section 1324b(e)(1) grants to a respondent the right to file an answer and to
appear and defend itself at the hearing. " ' ' The judge can conduct no hearing
until at least five days have elapsed from the date of service of the
complaint. 1 2
As any employment law practitioner will attest, preparation for the de-
fense of even a relatively straightforward discrimination case involving the
termination of a single individual may take a great deal of time and effort.
The statute prescribes short time periods in which to work. The 1986 Act
may also further hamper necessary preparation since it allows for class ac-
tion types of litigation in pattern or practice situations, 13 which include the
most difficult and complex of litigation activities. Although no section
1324b hearing may begin less than five days from respondent's receipt of the
106. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324b(d)(3) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
107. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982). The United States
Supreme Court found that an untimely filing of a charge with the EEOC does not raise a
jurisdictional defect, but rather results in treatment similar to that under a statute of limita-
tions, and stands subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. Id.








complaint, a practitioner must hope that ALJs will recognize such practical
considerations when scheduling hearings.
L. Section 1324b(e)(2): "Judges Hearings Cases"
Section 1324b(e)(2) of the 1986 Act requires that the Attorney General
specially designate ALJs to hear unfair immigration-related employment
practice cases and that these ALJs must possess "special training respecting
employment discrimination."' "14 Moreover, as much as possible, these desig-
nated ALJs should consider only cases arising from section 1324b.115 In
practical terms, this provision may represent one of the most important of all
the provisions contained in the Frank Amendment. As discussed in greater
detail below, these ALJs will be exercising an authority unique in the em-
ployment law field, inasmuch as no board or agency panel will review their
decisions. Instead, a party may appeal ALJ decisions directly to the United
States courts of appeals." 6 These ALJ decisions will become fundamentally
important in that they will determine the effectiveness of the 1986 Act as an
expression of national policy. The fairness and regularity of the proceedings
that the ALJs conduct, and the accuracy and evenhandedness of the witness-
credibility resolutions they make, will determine not only whether justice
prevails in a particular case, but more importantly whether the public at-
taches confidence to this statutory process.
The above-mentioned considerations may have caused Congress, in sec-
tion 1324b(e)(2), to specify that ALJs constitute the finders of fact in section
1324b proceedings and that the Attorney General designate only ALJs with
employment discrimination experience and training. 1 7 Both of these quali-
fiers appear to eliminate immigration judges of the INS from consideration.
First, these judges are not ALJs, and second, they likely do not possess the
requisite employment discrimination training, since heretofore this country's
immigration laws did not treat that subject.
Many agencies and departments of the federal government employ cadres
of ALJs, and several governmental bodies handle employment discrimina-
tion matters. In the latter category, one such organization is the EEOC,
which, however, has no ALJs. Another such agency is the NLRB, which, in
comparison, has more than 100 ALJs who deal extensively with employment
discrimination cases. Apparently, the NLRB possesses the most likely pool
from which the Attorney General may designate ALJs who meet the statu-
torily required experience factor.
M. Section 1324b(e)(3): "Complainant as Party"
Section 1324b(e)(3) allows an ALJ to consider the complainant as a full
party in any proceeding that concerns his or her charge held before such
114. Id. § 1324b(e)(2).
115. Id.
116. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
117. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324b(e)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
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ALJ. "1 8 This section also gives ALJs the discretion to allow other interested
persons to intervene." 19 By allowing a complainant all the rights of a litiga-
tion party in cases where the complainant institutes the action, the Frank
Amendment grants alleged discrimination victims the same rights that title
VII claimants who file in a United States district court possess.
Section 1324b(e)(3) also would apparently apply, however, even when the
Special Counsel has brought the complaint. In such a case the complainant
may still act as a full litigation party. If this result is the effect of section
1324b(e)(3), then the Frank Amendment gives alleged victims of employ-
ment discrimination substantially more rights than they would enjoy under
other statutes. 120 For example, under the enforcement scheme of the
NLRA, only the NLRB's General Counsel can bring or prosecute com-
plaints. 12 1 The NLRA does not provide for a private right of action for
victims of unfair labor practices.122 Also, although the charging party in a
hearing before an ALJ of the NLRB may procedurally be a party for the
purpose of service of pleadings or briefs, clearly the NLRB's General Coun-
sel possesses sole prosecutorial responsibility. 23 The NLRA charging party
may participate, but does not play the lead litigation role. 124 Under section
1324b(e)(3) of the 1986 Act it is not clear how vital a litigation party the
complainant may be when the Special Counsel brings the complaint. The
Special Counsel may need to draft litigation procedures carefully in order to
avoid confusion and conflicting trial tactics.
N. Sections 1324b(f)(1) and (2): "Testimony and Authority of Hearing
Officers-Testimony-Authority of Administrative Law Judges"
Sections 1324b(f)(1) and (2) state that: (1) transcripts are to be made of
proceedings before ALJs; (2) the Special Counsel and the relevant ALJ shall
possess the ability to examine the evidence, within reason, of those being
investigated; (3) the ALJs may require the appearance of witnesses and the
production of evidence by subpoena; and (4) subpoena enforcement is to be
in a United States district court.' 25 These subsections, therefore, involve
both the investigation of charges and the conduct of hearings on com-
plaints.1 26 Pursuant to the Attorney General's Proposed Regulations, the
Special Counsel possesses charge-investigation powers in order to obtain
from respondents evidence that they may not wish to relinquish volunta-
rily.' 27 Furthermore, the ALJ may issue subpoenas, both ad testificandum
and duces tecum, for use in litigation. 28
118. Id. § 1324b(e)(3).
119. Id.
120. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1982).
121. See 29 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1982).
122. Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261, 262-63 (1940).
123. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982).
124. Container Sys. Corp. v. NLRB, 521 F.2d 1166, 1172 (2d Cir. 1975).
125. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324b(f)(1), (2) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
126. Id.
127. Proposed Regulations, supra note 18, § 44.302.
128. Id. § 44.307.
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Interestingly, the 1986 Act gives little guidance regarding how ALJs
should conduct these hearings other than specifying that a transcript is to be
made. 129 In his Proposed Regulations, however, the Attorney General
stated that "the hearing and' promulgation of [an] order shall be conducted
in conformity with 5 U.S.C. [ §§ ] 554-557 (sections 5-8 of the Administrative
Procedures Act) ... ."-130 Yet, whether the parties will be allowed any pre-
hearing discovery rights is presently unclear. Whether pre-hearing motions
for summary judgment or motions in limine will be in order also remain as
undecided issues. Furthermore, the Attorney General clearly intends that
the Federal Rules of Evidence not apply. 13'
In addition, since the Frank Amendment is patterned, in part, upon the
enforcement scheme of the NLRA, and since the NLRB-employed ALJs,
like those to be designated under the 1986 Act, follow the Administrative
Procedures Act, 132 a brief examination of several established rules involving
the conduct of unfair labor practice proceedings under the NLRA could
prove useful:
(1) the NLRB has never allowed such pre-trial discovery as written inter-
rogatories, requests for admissions, requests for production of documents,
and the.like in unfair labor practice litigation, and depositions are very sel-
dom taken; 133
(2) pre-trial depositions are only allowed upon a showing of good cause,
such as the unavailability of a witness due to illness or distance from the
hearing; 134
(3) the Federal Rules of Evidence apply to NLRA hearings only when
practicable, and ALJs of the NLRB are given wide discretion in this
regard; '3 5
(4) prior to an unfair labor practice hearing the parties do not exchange
witnesses and document lists; and
(5) the closest approximation to discovery that a party will receive in a
case before an ALJ of the NLRB is that, upon demand following the direct
examination of a witness by the NLRB's General Counsel, the NLRB must
turn over to an opposing party's counsel for purposes of cross examination
and credibility impeachment pre-trial statements made to NLRB investiga-
tion agents. 136 Assuming, for the sake of argument, that ALJ proceedings
129. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324b(f)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
130. Proposed Regulations, supra note 18, § 44.306(f).
131. See id. § 44.306(g). The Attorney General's proposed rules state that "technical rules
of evidence shall not apply to hearings conducted pursuant to this paragraph." Id.
132. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 576, 701-707 (1982).
133. NLRB, CASE HANDLING MANUAL, UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE PROCEEDINGS, pt.i,
§ 10292.4 (1983).
134. NLRB Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 102.30 (1986); see Limpco Mfg. Inc., 225
N.L.R.B. 987, 988 n.2 (1976).
135. See Carpenter Sprinkler Corp. v. NLRB, 605 F.2d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 1979) (Board not
required to abide automatically by rules of evidence governing trials); NLRB v. Process &
Pollution Control Co., 588 F.2d 786, 791 (10th Cir. 1978) (rules of evidence not rigidly im-
posed on Board).
136. See Ra-Rich Mfg. Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 700, 704 (1958); see also Jencks v. United
States, 353 U.S. 657, 668-69 (1957) (defendant entitled to inspect agent's reports to further his
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under section 1324b of the 1986 Act follow the pattern described above,
numerous issues appear to need resolution in the near future, including:
(1) Given the fact that pattern or practice allegations raise class action
kinds of issues, and considering that class actions in the federal court system
have proven to be among the most complex of litigation matters, how will
Frank Amendment ALJs handle these cases without allowing the parties
some minimal discovery?
(2) Although the Supreme Court's decision in Jencks v United States137
apparently requires the Special Counsel to turn over witness statements after
direct testimony, Jencks only makes the government produce witness state-
ments. Since the Frank Amendment allows the charging party to file a com-
plaint on his or her own behalf, can the ALJ require production of witness
statements under those circumstances?
(3) To what extent will parties be allowed access to materials in the files of
the Special Counsel, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act?138
(4) To what extent will the Privacy Act of 1974139 be adhered to by the
Special Counsel?
(5) Since charging parties appear to have an unfettered right to file a com-
plaint with the ALJ, if the Special Counsel does not act after 120 days from
the date the charge is received, will any means be developed for screening
frivolous claims? 140
0. Sections 1324b(g)(1) and (2)(A): "Determinations-Order-Orders
Finding Violations-In General"
Subsections 1324b(g) through (j) of the 1986 Act confer powers upon
Frank Amendment ALJs that appear greater than those possessed by any
other corps of ALJs in the federal service.' 4' Beginning with section
1324b(g)(1) and (2)(A), ALJ decisions are given final order status, unless a
party appeals under section 1324b(i).' 42 Using a preponderance of the evi-
dence standard, if the ALJ determines that an unfair immigration-related
employment practice has taken place, that judge must state his or her find-
ings and conclusions in writing, and must serve such findings on the relevant
parties, along with a cease and desist order. 43
Authority to issue such cease and desist orders creates a power that sets
1986 Act ALJs apart from their brethren at other agencies and departments.
For example, under the NLRA, a recommended order, which is appealable
defense); 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1982) (after a government witness has testified on direct cross-
examination, court may order government to provide any relevant statements of witness to
defendant).
137. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
138. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-707 (1982).
139. Id. § 552a.
140. Some provisions for pre-hearing summary judgment motions may be necessary if the
system is to avoid being bogged down with insubstantial cases.
141. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324b(g)-(j) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
142. Id.
143. Id. § 1324b(g)(2)(A).
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to the NLRB itself, embodies an ALJ's decision.144 Under the NLRA, only
the NLRB possesses the authority to issue a cease and desist order, and the
NLRB cannot enforce these orders since they depend upon application to
the United States courts of appeals for enforcement. 145 Since the Frank
Amendment does not provide for any kind of board to review decisions of its
ALJs, such ALJs stand in a position similar to that of United States district
court judges, whose decisions are also reviewed directly by the courts of
appeals.
P. Section 1324b(g)(2)(B): "Contents of Order"
Section 1324b(g)(2)(B) gives a Frank Amendment ALJ the authority to:
(1) order a respondent employer to hire or to re-employ the discriminatee(s);
(2) order the payment of back wages to victims of unlawful discrimination;
and (3) assess a penalty of $1,000 per discriminatee, or $2,000 per dis-
criminatee if the employer has previously been found guilty of an unfair im-
migration-related employment practice. 146 The ALJ may also order the
payment of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. 147 Taken together, these
remedies give Frank Amendment ALJs considerable authority. This discre-
tion requires that the Attorney General carefully select these ALJs. Indeed,
such remedy options approach those of United States district court judges in
title VII cases and certainly exceed those granted to ALJs of the NLRB.
While NLRB ALJs, like Frank Amendment ALJs, may determine back pay
and reinstatement issues, such ALJs lack authority to order the payment of
attorneys' fees, and they may not levy civil monetary penalties.' 48 ALJs of
the NLRB are also bound by existing NLRB precedent, regardless of
whether the individual ALJ agrees with the historical NLRB rulings on a
particular issue.' 49 Since Frank Amendment ALJs have no reviewing ad-
ministrative body, the only check upon their findings of fact and conclusions
of law will be the courts of appeals, or ultimately the Supreme Court. In-
deed, because the various courts of appeals often differ with respect to statu-
tory interpretation and other significant legal principles, and since section
1324b ALJs will be hearing cases in the geographical territories of all courts
of appeals, parties may reasonably assume that these ALJs will not feel abso-
lutely bound by the precedent of any court, other than the Supreme Court
itself. In consideration of these possibilities, and in recognition of the fact
that years may pass before courts and ALJs hand down definitive rulings
regarding the many questions raised by the 1986 Act, the Frank Amend-
ment ALJ's initial power may fairly be characterized as awesome.
144. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982).
145. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 898-99 (1984).
146. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324b(g)(2)(B) (Law. Co-op. 1987). Subsections 1324b(g)(2)(B)(i) and
(ii) give the ALJ the authority to order a respondent to comply with the requirements of the
1986 Act's § 1324a(b), which involves hiring verifications, for a three-year period, and also to
retain, for this same time period, the names and addresses of all applicants for employment.
Id.
147. Id. § 1324b(h).
148. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982).
149. See Consolidated Casinos Corp., 266 N.L.R.B. 988 (1983).
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Q. Section 1324b(g)(2)(C): "Limitations on Back Pay Remedy"
Section 1324b(g)(2)(C) states that an ALJ may not order back pay to ac-
crue "from a date more than two years prior to the date of the filing of a
charge with an administrative law judge."' 150 This emphasized portion ap-
pears important because it reduces the potential back pay that a complainant
may receive under the 1986 Act, as compared to what the claimant might
receive if he or she maintained the case under title VII. Under title VII,
back pay liability may not accrue from a date more than two years prior to
the filing of the relevant charge with the EEOC. 151 The result is that the
back pay "meter" continues to run for a title VII complainant for the entire
period that the EEOC administratively processes the charge; the longer it
takes to resolve such a title VII claim, the more back pay may ultimately be
awarded. Under section 1324b(g)(2)(C), however, an ALJ will measure
back pay from the date a complaint is filed with the ALJ, as opposed to the
Special Counsel. 152 A 1986 Act complainant thus loses back pay time for
the investigation period. This factor should provide some incentive for 1986
Act complainants to file their charges with ALJs within a reasonable time
after the right to file matures.
Section 1324b(g)(2)(C) includes additional provisions. The most impor-
tant of these provisions reduces the amount of back pay by interim earn-
ings.153 In this respect, the Frank Amendment appears consistent with the
remedy schemes of both title VII and the NLRA. 154 The importance of this
back pay issue makes it useful to set forth a few principles that have devel-
oped under these employment discrimination statutes. These principles
include:
(1) courts normally consider unemployment compensation benefits as col-
lateral earnings and, as such, not deductible from back pay;155
(2) back pay awards reflect the discriminatee's total earnings, including re-
muneration for overtime, sick pay, medical expenses that insurance carried
by the employer would have covered, vacation pay, pension and profit shar-
ing contributions, etc.; 156
150. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324b(g)(2)(C) (Law. Co-op. 1987) (emphasis added).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
152. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324b(g)(2)(C) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
153. Id.
154. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
155. See NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 363-64 (1951) (Board did not exceed
power in refusing to deduct from back pay sums paid to employees as unemployment compen-
sation); EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 645 F.2d 183, 195 (4th Cir. 1981) (district court correct in
not requiring back pay to be reduced by amount of unemployment compensation), rev'd on
other grounds, 458 U.S. 219 (1982); Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730,
736 (5th Cir. 1977) (district court properly used discretion in not deducting unemployment
compensation from back wages).
156. See, e.g., Sinclair v. Automobile Club, 773 F.2d 726, 729 (10th Cir. 1984) (wage rate
used to assess back pay included those wages calculated on an incentive); Pettway v. Ameri-
can Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 263 (5th Cir. 1974) (back pay defined to include interest,
overtime, shift differentials, vacation, and sick pay), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1243, cert. dismissed, 467 U.S. 1247 (1984); EEOC v. St. Joseph Paper Co.,
557 F. Supp. 435, 442 (W.D. Tenn. 1983) (contributions required of employer in order to
restore employee in pension plan); Prestige Bedding Co., 212 N.L.R.B. 690, 691 (1974) (em-
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(3) while the complainant possesses an affirmative duty to seek out other
employment, and thereby to mitigate his damages, the employer usually pos-
sesses the difficult burden of proving what the complainant could have
earned had he or she used proper diligence in satisfying this duty;157 and
(4) courts exclude periods during which the complainant has been removed
from the job market in determining the back pay that is due. These periods
encompass absences due to such events as illness and returning to school,
among others. 5 8
R. Section 1324b(g)(2)(D): "Treatment of Distinct Entities"
Section 1324b(g)(2)(D) of the Frank Amendment 159 contains language
identical to that found in the last paragraph of section 1324a(e)(4), which
covers sanctions. 16° Both of these provisions define "distinct entities" for
purposes of the progressive application of monetary penalties. Under section
1324b the civil penalty that an ALJ may assess increases from $1,000 to
$2,000 per violation, if a previous ALJ has found that the respondent earlier
committed an unfair immigration-related employment practice. 16 1 The in-
tent of section 1324b(g)(2)(D), therefore, is to define the relevant employing
subdivision or entity for purposes of determining whether a previous offense
has been committed. The statute attempts to protect a large entity from its
subdivisions' transgressions. 162 Since each subdivision's violations do not
ployer required to compensate employee's estate for insurance benefits it would have received
but for the discriminatory practices).
157. See Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 696 (9th Cir. 1978) (burden of
proving failure to mitigate on employer); NLRB v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 360 F.2d
569, 575 (5th Cir. 1966) (failure to reasonably seek interim work an affirmative defense to back
pay liability, and employer carries burden of proof).
158. Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394, 401 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1041 (1977); Peters v. Missouri-Pac. R.R., 483 F.2d 490, 492 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1002 (1973).
159. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324b(g)(2)(D) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
160. Id. § 1324a(e)(4).
161. Id. § 1324b(g)(2)(B).
162. A Congressional committee specifically discussed this confusing concept of "distinct
entities" when determining the process for counting violations. The committee stated that:
The legislation also provides that in counting the number of previous determi-
nations of violations for purposes of determining which penalty applies, determi-
nations of more than one violation in the course of a single proceeding or
adjudication are counted as a single determination. Moreover, in the case of a
corporation or other entity composed of distinct, physically separate subdivi-
sions which do their own hiring and recruiting for employment (with reference
to the practices of, or under the control of, or common control with another
subdivision) such subdivision shall be considered a separate person or entity.
Under this provision a parent corporation, such as a large automaker, which has
several subdivisions that hire independently of each other would be held jointly
responsible whenever one of its subdivisions violates the provisions of this Sec-
tion.
For example, suppose automaker A has two distinct subdivisions, X and Y.
In 1984, subdivision X commits its second violation, i.e., it becomes liable under
the first civil fine provision. At that point, automaker A is jointly responsible
with X for such liability. In 1985, subdivision Y commits its first violation ....
At that point, automaker A is, like Y, responsible for that violation. However,
insofar as A is concerned, the violation by Y is A's first violation. That is to say
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count toward the parent's progressive accumulation of penalties under either
the Frank Amendment or that portion of the 1986 Act that deals with sanc-
tions, this provision may provide some incentive for employers to decentral-
ize their human resource functions.
S. Section 1324b(g)(3): "Orders Not Finding Violations"
Like most statutes that provide remedies for employment discrimination,
the 1986 Act states that if the ALJ finds no violation he or she must issue an
order of dismissal. 163 The judge must also state his or her findings of fact. 164
This portion of the Frank Amendment appears self-explanatory.
T Section 1324b(h): "Awarding of Attorneys' Fees"
In a marked departure from the levels of authority granted to ALJs of
other federal agencies dealing with employment discrimination, section
1324b(h) allows the award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party, but not
to the Special Counsel.165 Such fees are allowed, however, only if the loser's
argument possesses no reasonable grounds in law and fact. 166 In the em-
ployment discrimination field, heretofore only United States district court
judges operating under title VII have had the authority to award attorneys'
fees.167 Once again a parallel situation exists between these two remedial
statutes, and one should compare the two.
The factors used by the courts in computing appropriate attorneys' fees in
a title VII case include: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and
difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill required to perform the legal service
properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to ac-
ceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee for similar work in the commu-
nity; (6) whether the fee arrangement with the client was fixed or contingent;
(7) the time limitations imposed upon the attorney by the client or the cir-
cumstances; (8) the amount of damages involved and the results obtained;
(9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the successful attorneys; (10)
the undesirability of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client; and (12) the size of fee awards granted by the
district court in similar cases. 168 Moreover, since, title VII, like section
the violation by Y is not added to the previous two violations by X to create
third stage liability (i.e., a second level civil fine) for automaker A. In short, the
parent corporation can never be subject to a level of offense that is higher than
the highest level reached by any of its independent subdivisions.
It must be emphasized that this limitation applies only to those situations
where the subdivisions of the corporation or entity do their own hiring and recruit-
ing for employment completely independent and irrespective of the other
subdivisions.
H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 92, at 60 (emphasis added).
163. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324b(g)(3) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
164. Id.
165. Id. § 1324b(h).
166. Id.
167. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982).
168. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974); see
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1324b(h) of the Frank Amendment, allows fee awards to the prevailing
party, one must note that the Supreme Court, in Christiansburg Garment Co.
v. EEOC,16 9 found that successful defendants may obtain attorneys' fees if
the court found the plaintiff's suit "frivolous, unreasonable or without foun-
dation,' 170 even if not initially brought in bad faith.
171
Unlike title VII, section 1324b(h) of the 1986 Act contains an attorneys'
fee qualifier. For instance, judges are to award fees only when the losing
party's argument had no reasonable basis. 172 The likelihood of attorneys'
fees being awarded pursuant to the Frank Amendment, therefore, appears to
lie between title VII's almost automatic award of fees when plaintiffs prevail
and the Christiansburg Garment "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foun-
dation" standard when defendants succeed in litigation. On balance, and
considering the remedial intent behind the Frank Amendment, parties may
anticipate that ALJs will generously decide the issue of whether they award
prevailing complainants attorneys' fees.
U Sections 1324b(i)(1) and (2): "Review of Final Orders-In General-
Further Review"
Under the Frank Amendment, the aggrieved individual may appeal ALJ
orders to the United States court of appeals for the circuit where the viola-
tion took place, where the employer resides, or where the employer transacts
business. 173 Appeals must be taken within sixty days of the AL's final or-
der.174 In this respect, the Frank Amendment borrows from the NLRA,
insofar as that statute details how appeals are to be taken from orders of the
NLRB itself. 175 Consequently, discussed below are a few NLRA principles
that have developed with regard to court review.
Under the Supreme Court's decision in Universal Camera v. NLRB 176 an
appellate court will affirm an agency decision if substantial evidence on the
record as a whole supports the decision. 177 Demonstrating that the standard
of judicial review is relatively narrow, however, the Court in Universal Cam-
era elaborated that an appellate court cannot set aside an NLRB decision
when the choices are conflicting and the reviewing court would have made a
Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177, 187-88 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (followed Johnson guide-
lines, specifically time and labor involved and rate of compensation).
169. 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
170. Id. at 422.
171. Id.; see Beard v. Annis, 730 F.2d 741, 745 (11th Cir. 1984) (within district court's
discretion to award attorney's fees to prevailing defendant if plaintiff's suit frivolous, unrea-
sonable, or without foundation, even if bad faith not proven).
172. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324b(h) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
173. Id. § 1324b(i)(1).
174. Id.
175. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f) (1982).
176. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
177. Id. at 488. A reviewing court may set aside an NLRB decision only "when it cannot
conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that decision is substantial, when viewed in




different decision by itself. 178 In practice, courts of appeals have generally
upheld NLRB factual determinations. 179 With respect to questions of law,
the courts have been somewhat less hesitant to intervene, 180 although they
generally tend to grant deference to that agency's expertise in its area of
specialty. 181
Accordingly, one may assume that, in reviewing decisions of Frank
Amendment ALJs, the courts of appeals will be reluctant to substitute their
judgment for the factual findings of the ALJs, if substantial evidence in the
record supports such findings. Moreover, since the ALJs will have the op-
portunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses, the appellate courts, as re-
viewing bodies, may accept the ALJs' credibility resolutions and will not
overturn such resolutions unless a clear preponderance of all the relevant
evidence demonstrates that the ALJs' determinations were incorrect.18 2
These considerations serve to underscore the critical role that section 1324b
ALJs will play with regard to the equitable administration of the 1986 Act.
V Sections 1324b(j)(1)-(4): "Court Enforcement of Administrative Orders
-In General-Court Enforcement Order-Enforcement Decree
in Original Review-Awarding of Attorneys' Fees"
ALJ orders are not self-enforcing under the Frank Amendment. Section
1324b(j) provides that if neither party takes an appeal to the applicable
United States court of appeals, either the Special Counsel or the complainant
may make enforcement application to the appropriate United States district
court.1 83 There exists no trial de novo in such a proceeding, however, inas-
much as the AL's decision will not be reviewed.' 84 Apparently district
court enforcement of an ALJ decision that neither party appealed will be
automatic. Finally, section 1324b(j) provides for the award of attorneys' fees
in connection with proceedings involving both court of appeal review and
district court enforcement.1 85
W Sections 1324b(k)(1) and (2): "Termination Date"
The Frank Amendment contains a "sunset" provision that allows the
178. Id.
179. See, e.g., Jim Causley Pontiac v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 122, 126 (6th Cir. 1980) (substantial
evidence supported finding); NLRB v. Tischler, 615 F.2d 509, 511 (9th Cir. 1980) (court up-
held findings of Board); Newport News Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co. v. NLRB, 602 F.2d 73, 78
(4th Cir. 1979) (evidence supported Board's factual determination of proximate cause of
strike).
180. Compare NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951)
(Court respected Board's legal findings) with Hi-Craft Clothing Co. v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 910,
914 (3d Cir. 1981) (courts grant less deference to Board's findings if the issue is a legal rather
than a factual one).
181. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944) (agency proper entity to
define employee and carry out other tasks primarily assigned to it).
182. See Standard Dry Wall Prods., Inc., 91 N.L.R.B. 544, 545 (1950) (trial examiner's
credibility findings overruled only on clear preponderance of all relevant evidence).





1986 Act's anti-discrimination measures to terminate if either of two condi-
tions are met.'8 6 First, section 1324b(k)(1) states that the amendment will
expire if Congress repeals the employer sanctions portion of section
1324a. 187 Second, the amendment will no longer apply to employment mat-
ters if: (1) the Comptroller General finds that employer sanctions have not
resulted in significant discrimination against eligible workers, or (2) the
Comptroller General finds such sanctions have created an unreasonable bur-
den on employers, and (3) the Congress approves such Comptroller General
report.188 Considering the strong feelings expressed throughout the legisla-
tive history of the 1986 Act regarding the need for sanctions and anti-
discriminatory measures, the "sun" may never "set" on the Frank
Amendment.
III. CONCLUSION
The Frank Amendment to the 1986 Act may prove to be one of the most
prolific sources of employment law litigation since the enactment of title VII,
at least in those states with a high percentage of aliens, both legal and illegal.
Procedurally, the Frank Amendment consists of a hybrid of several federal
laws that Congress designed to combat employment discrimination, most
notably title VII and the NLRA. Consequently, much of the case law that
the Frank Amendment will generate likewise will be borrowed from analo-
gous federal statutes. Much within the amendment is unique, however, par-
ticularly the sweeping powers given the ALJs that the Attorney General will
specially designate. This select band of men and women will constitute the
pioneers in this unfolding chapter in the ever-evolving world of employment
discrimination law.
186. Id. § 1324b(k).
187. Id.
188. Id.
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